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 CubeSats have become an attractive platform for affordable, quick-turn spaceflight in spite 
of the volume, mass, and power constraints imposed by the platform [1]. These constraints make 
the use of radiation-hardened (rad-hard) electronics in most cases prohibitive. Rad-hard electronic 
parts have larger footprints, are more massive, and consume more power than their commercial 
counterparts in return for immunity to the radiation environment of space. Using rad-hard 
electronics in CubeSat systems increases costs and can make meeting the volume, mass, and power 
constraints difficult. Using commercial off-the-shelf electronics (referred herein as COTS) 
increases the risk of failure for the system, but strategies like “Careful COTS” have been developed 
by the community to mitigate the radiation concerns [2]. This includes total ionizing dose (TID) 
screening of COTS and latch-up mitigation with electrical current and thermal limiting circuitry.  
The evaluation of electronic piece parts performance related to the space radiation 
environment is Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) [3], [4]. RHA is the methodology for 
ensuring that the radiation environment does not degrade or damage the electronics to the point 
that the system can no longer function during the lifetime of the mission. This process includes 
defining system requirements, defining the radiation environment, selecting and testing COTS, 
and designing for radiation-tolerance. The result is a system that is reliable for a particular space 
environment and focuses on ensuring that the system can carry out the mission with electronics 
that have non-destructive failure modes and that system has mitigation or circumvention of 
radiation-induced errors and non-destructive radiation event failures. When reviewing the RHA 
process, it is important to present the methodology in a format that makes the discussion and 
review of the decisions made during the RHA process easy to follow. NASA’s Office of Safety 
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and Mission Assurance (OSMA) created the NASA Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) 
hierarchy that allows for the reliability and maintainability activities and decisions for a system to 
be presented in a graphical format [5]. In addition to making evaluation of the reliability of a 
system easier, the R&M hierarchy also moves reliability evaluation of systems into the Model-
based System Engineering (MBSE) paradigm. MBSE is the application of models to support 
activities related to system requirements, design, analysis, verification, and validation through the 
entire life-cycle of a system [6]. 
This thesis utilizes Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), a graphical argument notation, and 
the R&M hierarchy to create a model for system validation activities related to the radiation 
reliability of a CubeSat experiment. The argument is supported by total ionizing dose (TID) 
screening of COTS, system-level single-event latch-up (SEL) detection, isolation, and recovery, 
and single-event functional interrupt (SEFI) recovery in the microcontroller. These mitigation 
strategies were chosen because of the radiation environment expected for the mission and the 
expected rate of single-event effects (SEEs) compared to the required uptime to complete the 
science mission objectives of the experiment. The result is a graphical assurance case specifically 
for the radiation reliability of a spacecraft system that uses COTS instead of rad-hard parts. 
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CHAPTER II 
OVERVIEW OF RADIATION EFFECTS 
Space Radiation Environment 
 The near-Earth space radiation environment can be divided into two types of particle 
groups: trapped and transient. The magnetosphere causes particles to become trapped in “belts” 
around the earth, mainly protons and electrons. The inner belt, which has trapped electrons and 
protons, starts at about 0.2 Earth radii which is 1,000 km. This is higher than some LEO satellites 
except for the dip in the belt at the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) where it decreases to 200 km 
from the surface of the earth which affects almost all LEO missions. Transient particles consist of 
galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and solar particle events. The hazards to circuits fall into three 
categories: TID, SEEs, and displacement damage (DD). There are also multiple types of events 
with SEEs. A more complete description of the space radiation environment can be found in [7]. 
Total Ionizing Dose (TID)  
Total Ionizing Dose (TID) is the accumulated charge deposited in a circuit over time. This 
is the result of high energy electrons and protons ionizing atoms and producing charge carriers as 
they pass through the dielectric layers of an integrated circuit (IC). The charge accumulated in the 
insulating oxides of the circuits changes the energy band structure in the transistor which causes 
parametric changes in the circuit behavior. For example, trapped charge in the gate oxide changes 
the gate potential needed to turn CMOS transistors off. This may lead to an increase in supply 
current for the IC and eventual functional failure. Trapped charge in field and buried oxides can 
create parasitic leakage paths in the IC and increase the static power leakage current. TID is 
generally becoming less of a reliability issue for CMOS digital ICs as transistors decrease in size 
and the thickness of the gate oxides is reduced, meaning many COTS can survive the dose 
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accumulated for short LEO missions, 30 krads(SiO2) or less. More details about the mechanisms 
of TID can be found in [8]. 
Single-Event Latch-up (SEL) 
Single-Event Latch-up (SEL) is when a particle strike deposits enough charge to turn on a 
parasitic p-n-p-n junction (thyristor) in an IC. The parasitic thyristor structure is shown below in  
Figure 1 and formed by the p+ contact to power, n-well, p-substrate, and n+ contact to 
ground path notated by the two bipolar transistors. The parasitic thyristor is inherent to the bulk 
CMOS process and is a concern for COTS which are mostly made with CMOS processes. The 
current needed to induce latch-up is determined by the bipolar gains and series resistances, which 
are determined by the geometry of the device. These factors change with the technology node, 
process, and specific circuit layout. The result of a latch-up is a self-sustaining electrical short 
between the power and ground of the circuit yielding a large current draw. In addition to disrupting 
the proper operation of the circuit, if power is not quickly removed, the high current event will 
permanently damage and destroy the circuit, introduce latent damage, or drain a battery source. If 
the latch-up has not damaged the circuit, power cycling the circuit will restore proper operation. 
More details about the mechanisms of SEL in different processes can be found in [9]. 
 
Figure 1: Two-transistor model for latch-up in an n-well CMOS structure [9] 
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Single-Event Upset (SEU) and Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) 
A Single-Event Upset (SEU) is when a particle strike deposits enough charge into a 
memory element to change the state of the memory, like changing a stored 0 to a stored 1. 
Depending on where the SEU occurs in the memory of an IC or system determines the type of 
fault that is seen for a system. SEUs in an SRAM for the experiment described in this thesis are 
detected by writing a known pattern to the memory and then reading it back and checking for 
differences. An SEU in the program counter register of a microcontroller will change the next 
instruction executed. This type of SEU is a Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) since the 
SEU in the control registers or program memory causes the microcontroller to execute the incorrect 
program order or instruction or stops program execution all together [10]. More details about the 
mechanisms of SEUs can be found in [11].  
Mitigation Strategies for COTS 
The use of COTS in spacecraft is not limited to CubeSats. NASA evaluates COTS for all 
types of missions when there are not rad-hard alternatives or cost limits the use of rad-hard 
electronics. In [12], the authors outline the radiation effects related issues with the use of COTS 
parts. In [2], the authors present a “Careful COTS” approach to using COTS in space systems. 
Selected strategies from [2] that are used in the CubeSat experiment design described in this thesis 
are described below. First, candidate COTS are screened by performing TID testing up to 30 
krads(SiO2). If the parts are still functional, they are selected for use. Other best practices include: 
1. Using the lowest supply voltage to decrease the latch-up rate for parts 
2. Using series resistors to limit current between pins that can be controlled by two 
different chips like I2C lines 
3.  Current and thermal limiting of power supplies 
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In [13], the authors present system level mitigation schemes for SEEs. The ones used in the 
CubeSat experiment design described in this thesis are described below. To mitigate SEL at the 
system level, current limiting and power cycling can be implemented with load switches. 
Watchdog timers (WDT) can be implemented as an “I’m okay” method of SEU detection in 
microcontroller [13]. In this scheme, the microcontroller periodically sends a pulse to a WDT as 
it goes through its normal operations. The WDT expects a pulse within a certain amount of time. 
If an SEFI has occurred in the microcontroller that causes it to stop sending the pulse, the WDT 
times out and sends a reset signal to a load switch. Resetting the microcontroller causes it to reload 
configuration from an SEU-immune memory, like an FRAM, and should clear any errors in the 
configuration registers of the microcontroller. 
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CHAPTER III 
OVERVIEW OF CUBESAT EXPERIMENT 
CubeSats are 10cm x 10cm x 11cm and up to 1.3 kg satellites developed at California 
Polytechnic State University in 1999 to make space flight achievable and affordable for 
universities and their students [14]. Using the Poly-Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD) to 
facilitate ride sharing and CubeSat deployment, 6 CubeSats were launched in 2003; in 2015, the 
425th CubeSat was launched [15]. The platform was originally used as training projects for 
undergraduate students to expose them to the challenges of real-engineering practices and system 
design. As the CubeSat platform has matured, the mission goals for CubeSats have expanded 
beyond education. For example, NASA has used the CubeSat form-factor for technology 
demonstrations and to perform science missions. Only 19 of the 425 CubeSats launched have had 
science objectives as the primary mission goal but both NSF and NASA are planning more 
CubeSats missions with science mission objectives in the next several years [1]. Universities are 
also including science as their CubeSat programs mature resulting in an increasing number of peer-
reviewed articles published and thesis and dissertations awarded with CubeSats in the title, e.g. 
[16], [17], [18], [19].  
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) Space Systems Working 
Group (SSWG) investigated the applicability of MBSE to CubeSats starting in 2011 with the goal 
of creating a CubeSat Reference Model. Their progress can be seen in [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], 
and [25]. In addition, NASA is applying MBSE to missions including Mars 2020, Europa Clipper, 
and Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP). Motivations for using MBSE include improving the 
quality of communications among development teams for systems and subsystems with the 
ultimate goal of reducing defects [26].  
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As CubeSats mature and have primary mission objectives beyond educating students and 
as the community creates and embraces MBSE for CubeSats, demonstrations of reliability 
arguments for CubeSats experiments are needed. 
Vanderbilt and the Institute for Space and Defense Electronics (ISDE) are interested in 
using CubeSats for science, specifically to evaluate radiation models used for single event rate 
predictions [27]. Vanderbilt designs and assembles science payloads and partners with other 
organizations or universities who provide the satellite structure, power, radio, and flight computer. 
The science objective for the experiment board described in this thesis is to count the number of 
upsets in a 28nm commercial SRAM on-orbit. This SRAM has been shown to be susceptible to 
SEU by low-energy protons [28] and electrons [29], [30] in ground tests. The on-orbit results will 
help evaluate if the contribution of low-energy protons and electrons to the upset rate requires 
changes to current rate prediction methods.  
To carry out this science mission, Vanderbilt is partnering with the Radio Amateur Satellite 
Corporation (AMSAT) to deliver a 1U CubeSat to be launched in 400 km to 800 km polar, low 
earth orbit (LEO) through NASA’s CubeSat Launch Initiative on ELaNa-XIV. Multiple CubeSats 
will be secondary payloads to JPSS-1 which will launch in early 2017. The Vanderbilt science 
payload, Phoenix, will include a VUC (Vanderbilt University Controller) and 3 REMs (Radiation 
Effects Modeling: 28nm SRAM experiment boards). The VUC acts as the interface between the 
AMSAT spacecraft bus and the REM experiments. The satellite is built using COTS but has been 
designed with radiation effects in mind. 
The following requirements related to SEEs are derived both from the science mission 
objective and a “do no harm” to the rest of the satellite philosophy.  
1. SEEs in peripheral electronics to not affect the validity of SEU data collection in the 
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SRAM 
2. SELs in the SRAM do not affect the validity of SEU data collection in the SRAM 
3. SELs are mitigated by the experiment and do not adversely affect the rest of the 
spacecraft 
In Figure 2, a simplified diagram of the REM experiment board is presented. The input 
power from the spacecraft is a regulated 3V rail (blue boxes in Figure 2). This 3V is divided to the 
different power domains by load switches to create a 3V_uC rail (green boxes in Figure 2) and 
3V_switch rail (orange box in Figure 2). There are three regulators on the board to provide the three 
voltage domains for the SRAM: 1.8V, 0.9V, and a variable core voltage (red boxes in Figure 2). The 
load switches provide current limiting which protects against SELs on the board. These load switches 
also prevent high current conditions from propagating to the VUC or the rest of the satellite. The 
load switches result in 5 different power domains on the experiment board which power all of the 
integrated circuits (ICs) on the board. The microcontroller handles reading and writing to the SRAM, 
counting the number of upsets, and communicating science data and health of the board to the VUC 
through an I2C bus. The WDT allows the microcontroller to recover from SEFIs. 
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Figure 2: Simplified Block Diagram on REM Experiment Board. The red boxes represent 
electronics that are powered by voltages specific to the SRAM which are the 1.8V (I/O), 0.9V 
(Logic) and variable core power rails. Green boxes represent electronics that are powered by the 
3V_uC power rail. The orange box represents the electronics powered by the 3V_switch rail. The 
blue boxes represent electronics that are powered by the 3V supplied by the spacecraft.  
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CHAPTER IV 
INTRODUCTION TO GOAL STRUCTURING NOTATION 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is a graphical notation standard used to explicitly 
document an assurance case [31]. An assurance case is a reasoned and compelling argument 
supported by evidence that a system will operate as intended for a given, defined environment. An 
argument is a connected series of claims that support an overall claim. Assurance cases, and by 
extension a GSN model, are only means of documenting an argument and do not establish the 
truth of the argument. Acceptance of the case requires the argument to be reviewed by stakeholders 
of the system. GSN provides a way of documenting the assurance case that allows others to discuss, 
challenge, and review the assurance case. GSN was created at the University of York in the 1990s 
and has been used in a variety of safety and security assurance cases including the Hawk Aircraft 
Safety Justification [32] and insulin pumps [33]. 
 
Figure 3: Elements of GSN 
GSN provides a structure to indicate how claims are supported by sub-claims. These claims 
in GSN are represented as goals. An example goal is “COTS electronics pass mission SEL 
requirement: No latch-up seen up to 5x109 protons/cm2.” A sub-claim, or child goal, is “FRAM 
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passes proton SEL mission requirement.” The goals for each of the electronic parts to pass the SEL 
requirement together support the claim that several of the parts in the system pass the SEL 
requirement. The assertion of evidence to support the truth of a goal is represented by a solution. 
An example solution is “No latch-up seen on FRAM(FM24Cl6B) up to 6.2x109 protons/cm2.” The 
stakeholders reviewing the assurance case would then decide if the test result is evidence enough 
to support the goal of “FRAM passes proton SEL mission requirement.” When documenting the 
reasoning between goals and child-goals, strategy elements are used. An example strategy is 
“Isolate and contain faults” which provides the task that specifies why the parent goal “Physical 
and functional pathways for fault propagation or combination are limited” is completed by the 
child goal “Latch-up faults are isolated and contained close to the fault source.” Goals, strategies, 
and solutions make up the base of the GSN structure and are connected with solid arrows and 
indicate inferential and evidential relationships. In summary, goals and strategies are alternately 
refined until the goal is specific enough to be supported by a solution element which links to the 
results of parts tests, system tests, simulations and analysis, literature review, etc. 
An assurance case is made within a certain environment. For a CubeSat experiment, the 
environment can include radiation, thermal profile, budget, and development time. There are 
several ways in GSN to show how the environment interacts with the assurance case. The first way 
is with a context element which provides information on how a goal or strategy should be 
interpreted. An example context is “Radiation environment for mission” which provides 
information for the goal “System remains functional for the intended radiation environment.” 
Details about the radiation environment are needed to ensure the system functionality system will 
not be compromised. 
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The second way of indicating the effect of the environment on the argument is through 
assumption elements. Assumptions are premises that need to be true in order for the goal or 
strategies to be valid. For example, the assumption “A SEFI in the microcontroller will cause it to 
stop sending the watchdog timer signal” is an assumption for the strategy “Implement detection 
and reset of a SEFI in the microcontroller using a watchdog timer.” There are cases when a SEFI 
would not stop the watchdog timer signal and it is up to the stakeholders to determine if that 
assumption is an acceptable risk in the system. Assumptions are valid for all the child strategies 
and goals further down the evidential path from the point where the strategy or goal the assumption 
first appears. 
The last way of indicating the effect of the environment on the argument is through a 
justification element. Justifications explain why a goal or strategy is acceptable. For example, the 
justification “Heavy-ion SEL tests were not performed because the heavy-ion environment does 
not significantly contribute to the radiation environment” is an explanation for the strategy 
“Perform proton SEL characterization tests on system parts.” A reviewer might ask why heavy-
ion SEL testing was not completed as it is a part of standard RHA activities and this explicitly 
states the reasoning for that decision. Assumptions, justifications, and context are connected to 
goal, strategies, and solutions with dotted arrows to indicate contextual relationships. In summary, 
assumptions, justifications, and context about the argument are linked to appropriate strategies or 
goals to further clarify the assurance case. In Figure 3, all of the elements of GSN are presented. 
During the development of the model, incomplete lines of reasoning can be indicated with 
an undeveloped element symbol. This indicates that the goal or strategy is not fully supported. 
For example, if a test has not been completed for a goal, then the evidence is undeveloped. Also 
during development, multiple ways of making an argument can be notated by using the M of N 
 14 
options connector. For example, in Figure 4, a part can be considered SEL immune by either 
performing radiation tests to the level required by the radiation environment or by applying 
knowledge regarding the process technology. Either of these solutions would support the goal of 
a part being SEL immune. When the GSN model is reviewed, the undeveloped element symbol 
and the M of N options connector should not be used in the model. They are tools for the reliability 
team to use during development and when creating a high-level template for other designers to 
use.  
 
Figure 4: M of N Options 
Reliability & Maintainability Hierarchy 
 NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) chose the GSN standard to 
create the NASA Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) Hierarchy in order to move from 
document-based reliability requirements to an objectives-based reliability model where tests are 
linked with objectives specific to the mission [5]. This hierarchy was created to fit into the growing 
infrastructure for Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) where models of the spacecraft 
systems and subsystems are used to define interfaces and evaluate interactions and fault 
propagation. The hierarchy is used to define the goals and strategies at the top-level for the GSN 
model presented here but has been modified to be more specific to radiation reliability concerns 
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and to allow for higher risk mitigation schemes. Figure 5 shows the top-level of the R&M 
hierarchy. In this hierarchy, objectives, which are like goals in GSN, state the technical goals of 
the project. Objectives are defined as goals to be accomplished while goals in GSN are defined as 
claims of the argument. The GSN model presented in this thesis uses goals because it is applied to 
a specific system and not a general guideline. Strategies facilitate the accomplishment of the 
objective, which is a more narrow definition of strategy than in GSN but is still a way of explaining 
how a sub-objective is completing part of an objective. These two blocks are used in an alternating 
hierarchical fashion to create a template which is broad enough to apply to a wide range of projects. 
In this thesis, this R&M hierarchy is applied to a specific project. Because the assurance case is 
being made for a specific project, all of the elements in GSN are used and are not limited to goals 
(objectives), strategies, and context elements.  Goals and strategies that come from the R&M 
hierarchy are denoted in the model with (NASA R&M) and annotated if they have been modified 
(NASA R&M mod).  
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Figure 5: R&M Template based on GSN notation. Objectives take the place of goals and only 
objective, strategy, and context elements are used.  
 The radiation reliability assurance case presented in the next chapter focuses on child goals 
2 and 3 in Figure 5 as related to radiation effects. A complete GSN model for the reliability and 
maintainability of the CubeSat experiment would include assurances cases for the system 
performance under nominal conditions, as seen in child goal 1, and also cases for the reliability 
related to other environmental factors like thermal conditions. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONSTRUCTION OF MODEL FOR CUBESAT EXPERIMENT 
 This chapter will go through the steps of constructing a GSN-based assurance case for the 
radiation reliability of the CubeSat experiment. The modeling of the case is done in WebGME, a 
web-based modeling tool that allows for the creation of domain-specific modeling languages [34]. 
The reliability modeling environment implemented in WebGME, as used in this thesis includes 
GSN, SysML, part library, fault propagation, and function modeling. The modeling environment 
is shown in Figure 6. The model appears in the modeling editor canvas. Modeling elements are 
chosen from the model parts panel, for example, GSN elements, and are modified using the 
attributes panel. For example, the attributes panel would be where the undeveloped symbol would 
be turned on. Other models can be navigated to through the model tree browser.  
 
Figure 6: WebGME modeling environment 
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Figure 7 details the method developed to create the GSN model that describe the assurance 
case for radiation reliability. The creation of functional and system models (Steps 2-4) help provide 
context for the radiation-reliability assurance case. Guidelines for linking different models together 
creates a starting place for integrating the GSN model of the assurance case to the larger MBSE 
paradigm and is an extension of the R&M Hierarchy. Steps 1-5 are described in this thesis. Steps 
6-9 are outlined in future work and show how the GSN model can integrate with other models in 
a MBSE paradigm. Steps 10-12 were completed and the flight unit of the CubeSat experiment was 
delivered. 
 
Figure 7: Flow chart for GSN model construction. Linking the different models is enabled through 
the creation of all the models in WebGME. 
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Functional Model 
To define the mission objective, the first step in the method, the designers must answer: 
What needs to be accomplished with this system? In the case of the CubeSat experiment, the board 
needs to reliably count and report the number of upsets in an SRAM. This objective forms the top-
level function for the functional decomposition. The second step to creating the assurance case is 
to create a high level functional model of the system. The functional model is a functional 
decomposition of the mission objective. The functional decomposition answers the question: What 
does the system need to do to accomplish the mission objective? 
For this CubeSat experiment, the mission objective is to reliably count and report the 
number of single-event upsets in the SRAM. This top-level function can be broken down into 3 
main sub-functions:  
 Read from and write to SRAM 
 Communicate telemetry to VUC 
 Recover from anomalies 
In order to expose and check the SRAM, the experiment needs to power the SRAM and read and 
write to the SRAM. In order to reliably count and report, the system needs to recover from 
anomalies. This is accomplished by detecting and recovering from SELs and SEFIs. This makes 
up the high level decomposition of the CubeSat experiment as seen in Figure 8. These functions 
are specific enough so that subsystems can be designed but broad enough that the design is not 
dictated by the functional decomposition.  
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Figure 8: Functional Decomposition of Mission Objective 
System Model 
The third step is to create a system model that will perform the functions in the functional 
model, answering the question: What is needed to implement the functions of the system? The 
WebGME environment includes a part library that contains the possible electronic components to 
be used in the system. Subsystems are built using parts in the part library. The system model is 
built from subsystems. Parts in the part library include parameters such as radiation test results, 
supply voltage, and current limits. These parameters allow for automated checks. The system 
model is created by connecting the subsystems and parts together in the SysML model in 
WebGME.  
 For this CubeSat experiment, the microcontroller was chosen because of past mission 
success and acceptable radiation testing results. It supports I2C communication, which is necessary 
for communicating with the spacecraft and fulfills F3: Communicate with spacecraft. This function 
can be seen in the connection between the VUC_Bus block and REM_Control block in Figure 9. 
The data bus on the microcontroller is bi-directional while the data bus on the SRAM is separated 
for data in and out. The microcontroller uses 3V logic while the SRAM uses 1.8V logic. In order 
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to read and write to the SRAM, a mux/demux and logic translator are needed. These two parts 
make up the Logic Translation block and accomplishes function F6: Read/Write to SRAM along 
with the microcontroller. The spacecraft provides 3.0V, but other voltages need to be created and 
regulated on the experiment board. For powering the SRAM, 1.8V, 0.9V, and a variable core 
voltage are needed. These three regulators are in the REM_Power block of the system diagram 
and fulfill function F5: Power SRAM. 
Also within the REM_Power block are load switches for the SRAM and for the 
microcontroller. These load switches provide detection of latch-up, fulfilling F7: Detect and 
Recover from SELs. If the current pulled through the load switch reaches the limit, the load switch 
turns off and circumvents the latch-up. Depending on the load switch type, either the 
microcontroller manually turns on the load switch or the load switch automatically turns back on 
after a certain amount of time.  
In order to fulfill function F8: Detect and recover from SEFIs, which occur in the 
microcontroller, an external watchdog timer is included in the REM_Power block. The watchdog 
timer expects a periodic pulse from the microcontroller. If an SEFI has occurred in the 
microcontroller that interrupts the program flow and stops the microcontroller from sending the 
pulse to the watchdog timer, the watchdog timer output is pulled low. The watchdog timer output 
is connected to the ON signal for the load switch to the microcontroller. By pulling the ON signal 
low, the microcontroller is turned off and then back on. After the reset, the microcontroller reloads 
its configuration from an SEU-immune FRAM. This clears any bad configuration in the 




Figure 9: System Model of CubeSat Experiment 
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Linking Functional and System Models 
 Once the system model is created, the functional model should point to the parts of the 
system that fulfill the functions and is step 4 in the method for developing the GSN model. Figure 
10 shows the functional decomposition with references to the system model. As described in the 
previous section, each of the functions is completed by part of the system. For example, F5: Power 
the SRAM is fulfilled by the regulators in the power block. Clicking on the symbol in the upper 
right corner of the reference takes the designer to the part being referenced in the system model 
within the WebGME environment. 
 
Figure 10: Functional model with references to system model 
GSN Model 
 The GSN model is a graphical assurance case for the radiation-reliability of the system. It 
presents on argument, using GSN goals and strategy elements. This argument is supported by 
evidence using GSN solution elements. The influence of the mission environment is shown 
through context, assumption, and justification elements. Other goals can be added to expand to 
other reliability concerns. The top-level goal is “System remains functional for intended radiation 
environment in order to complete science mission objective: Record the number of upsets in 28nm 
 24 
bulk SRAM in LEO for a period of 1 year.” The first part of this goal is the same for all CubeSat 
experiments and is the top-level objective in the R&M hierarchy. The mission objective will 
change for different experiments and will change the low-level goals based on what mitigation 
strategies are needed to complete the science mission in the mission environment. The contexts 
for this goal link to the other models in the development environment as well as documents that 
describe the mission environment and constraints. These models and documents will change for 
different experiments or systems.  
 The overall strategy, Strategy 1, is “Understand radiation failure mechanisms, eliminate 
and/or control radiation failure cause and degradation, and limit radiation failure propagation to 
reduce likelihood of failure to an acceptable level.” Through understanding radiation failure 
mechanisms, the radiation failure mechanisms for this system can be constrained to TID, SEL, and 
SEFIs. Two goals are used to mitigate these failure mechanisms. The system is “designed to 
withstand radiation stresses for the life of the mission” (Goal 2) and the system “is tolerant to 
radiation faults and failures” (Goal 3). Goal 2 presents test that show the COTS part is tolerant to 
the radiation environment and references the system level mitigation when the part is not tolerant 
or the tolerance is unknown. Goal 3 presents system-level mitigation of radiation-induced faults 
on COTS parts. The complete top-level hierarchy is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Top-level GSN model 
 In order to show that the system can withstand the radiation environment, part 
characterization tests are performed or SEL effects are mitigated as seen in Figure 12. Assumption 
1 explicitly states the assumption that radiation test from one lot of a part will apply to a different 
lot. This differs from the radiation hardness assurances (RHA) best practices which recommend 
lot testing and introduces risk to the system. The risk from this assumption can be discussed at 
reviews since it is called out in the model. Justification 1 explicitly states that heavy-ion SEL tests 
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were not performed which again deviates from standard RHA campaigns and gives a reason for 
that decision. The part test results are presented for proton SEL testing and TID testing in Figure 
13 and Figure 14, respectively. 
 
Figure 12: Parts Characterization Hierarchy 
 





Figure 14: TID Tests Hierarchy. 
Assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 6 in Figure 13 and Figure 14 identify when tests were performed 
on parts in the same family but not on the specific part number used in the system. Goal 19 is 
marked as undeveloped because the TID test results have not been compiled into a report. Goal 7 
describes the SEL mitigation strategies for the COTS that failed proton SEL testing or were not 
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tested and is discussed later in this section when Goal 7 is referenced again when the SEL recovery 
strategies are described. This completes the argument made starting at Goal 2 in Figure 11.  
 The argument started at Goal 3 describes the system level mitigation techniques for SEEs 
and is presented in Figure 15. Strategy 2 describes the approach taken to making the system 
tolerant to faults. The radiation-induced faults need to be detected early and stopped to minimize 
the effect on the system. Goal 4 covers detection and recovery from SELs and the detection and 
recovery of SEFIs in the microcontroller.  
 
Figure 15: SEL Detection and Isolation Hierarchy 
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Figure 16: SEE Recovery Hierarchy 
Figure 16 describes the strategies and goals for fault management and recovery. Goal 13 
describes how SEL faults are stopped from propagating. Goal 14 describes how SEL faults can be 
detected and recovered from in a way that minimizes impact to the mission. SEL detection is the 
same as it was described before in Goal 6. Goal 15 and 16 describe the detection of and recovery 
from SEFIs in the microcontroller, respectively.  
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Figure 17: Fault Propagation Hierarchy 
Figure 17 describes the argument for SEL isolation. This is important for the “do no harm” 
to the rest of the satellite requirement. Figure 18 provides the evidence for detection and isolation 
of latch-up. Most of the evidence is bench-top testing but some board level proton SEL testing was 









Figure 19: SEL Recovery Hierarchy 
Figure 19 presents the evidence for SEL recovery. Load switches are used to bring the 
power buses back up after high current conditions. Goal 34 is to ensure that only upsets from 
particle strikes in the SRAM are counted. Latch-up could cause read or write failures that would 
increase the upset count or alternatively, improperly characterize the livetime if an exposure is 
interrupted and not terminated properly.  
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Figure 20: SEFI Detection Hierarchy  
 
Figure 21: SEFI Recovery Hierarchy 
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Figure 20 and Figure 21 describe the argument for SEFI detection and recovery. A watchdog timer 
is used to detect SEFIs in the microcontroller. As stated in Assumption 5, this will only detect 
SEFIs in the microcontroller that cause the microcontroller to stop sending the signal to the 
watchdog timer. Other SEFI and SEU detection techniques can be implemented in software if 
deemed necessary. Recovery from SEFI happens by using the watchdog timer to turn off and then 
on the load switch which resets the microcontroller. 
Future Work: Linking GSN Model to Other Models 
 The GSN model can be built upon in WebGME by linking to other models. This is not part 
of the GSN standard but is an extension that allows for GSN models to interact with other models 
in an MBSE paradigm. Linking GSN models with other models allows for system environment 
changes to propagate to the reliability argument. For example, the system model is where 
requirements and interface information is represented. Linking GSN elements to the system model 
would then allow for a requirement change in the system model to propagate to the GSN model. 
The rules for linking the models provide a systematic approach to the integration of the 
models and makes the process less arbitrary. The rules are also designed to allow for automation 
of checking the rules. All of the solutions should be linked to parts and subsystems in the part 
library. The part library is where test data about parts is stored. All of the parent goals of the 
solutions should be linked to either a subsystem or part in the system model or a function in the 
functional model. If any of the parent goals are not linked to the system or functional model, then 
the functional and system models are incomplete and should be revised. Every bottom level 
function in the functional model and every subsystem and part in the system model should be 
referenced in the GSN model at least one time. If they are not, then the GSN model has not 
considered the entire system for radiation reliability. After these two checks are done, the model 
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is ready for review. These checks do not guarantee a complete GSN model but they are easily 
automated and identify arguments overlooked in the modeling environment. The development of 
the radiation reliability assurance case summarized in this chapter completes the process described 
in Figure 7. 
 Figure 22 shows how links from solutions to the parts library are implemented. The 
solution on the left is Solution 2 in Figure 13 which is the result from proton SEL testing the 
FRAM. By clicking the symbol on the upper right corner of the reference, WebGME displays the 
FRAM model in the library. Within the FRAM model are relevant parameters about the FRAM 
including the proton SEL cross-section. The details of the parameter are seen in the bottom right 
pane. These parameters allow for automation of comparing radiation results to mission 
requirements for parts in the part library. 
 




Figure 23: Linking Goals with System Model 
Figure 23 shows linking parent goals of solutions to other models. The goal on the left is 
the parent goal of Solution 2 which is Goal 9: “FRAM (FM24V10-GTR) passes SEL mission 
requirement.” By double-clicking on the Goal in the GSN model, WebGME shows the screen on 
the left which is where references and parameters related to the goal are seen “inside” the goal 
element. When the symbol on the top right of the reference is clicked, it displays the FRAM in the 
Control Block of the system model, as seen on the right. Higher level strategies, goals, and contexts 




A complete assurance case for the radiation reliability of the CubeSat experiment REM is 
presented using GSN. The CubeSat experiment was designed to mitigate the radiation environment 
through COTS screening and system level mitigation schemes. The assurance case for REM 
modifies the R&M Template [5] created to address missions that use radiation-hardened parts, and 
provides a template for building the radiation-reliability assurance case for COTS-based systems. 
The case was created in WebGME and therefore includes support for system modeling, functional 
modeling, and fault propagation. The GSN model can also be traversed in software to perform 
automated labeling and eventually some simple quantitative analysis like issuing warnings when 
solutions and their parent goals are not linked to supporting models. 
This assurance case included an argument for the use of COTS latch-up sensitive 
electronics with mitigation at the system level. This strategy was considered to present an 
acceptable amount of risk to the CubeSat experiment by the stakeholders for the REM system. The 
same strategy might not be acceptable for systems that must meet high-availability requirements 
and the SEL rate in the space environment is too high to accomplish the mission objective. 
During the creation of the GSN radiation-reliability assurance case for the CubeSat 
experiment, several advantages of the GSN approach over a document-based approach were 
discovered. Assumptions that are hidden within text arguments surface through the assumption 
boxes. The structure of a GSN argument imposes rigor on the assurance case through the 
relationships between goals and solutions. Tests are linked with solutions in the assurance case 
and the goals that they support can be traced through the model. By organizing the assurance case 
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into goals and child-goals, the logic of the argument for radiation reliability is made explicit in the 
graphical model. In addition, the model allows for the mission assurance objectives to fit into the 
larger MBSE paradigm for system design. The end result of the GSN argument construction is an 
easy-to-follow graphical representation of factors affecting the radiation reliability of the CubeSat 






[1]  National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, "Achieving Science with 
CubeSats: Thinking Inside the Box," The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 
2016. 
[2]  D. Sinclair and J. Dyer, "Radiation Effects and COTS Parts in SmallSats," in Proceedings 
of the AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites, SSC13-IV-3, 2013.  
[3]  J. L. Barth, K. A. LaBel and C. Poivey, "Radiation assurance for the space environment," 
in Integrated Circuit Design and Technology, 2004. ICICDT '04. International Conference 
on, 2004, pp. 323-333.  
[4]  C. Poivey, "Radiation Hardness Assurance for Space Systems," in Notes from the 2002 
IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Short Course, Phoenix, AZ.  
[5]  F. J. Groen, J. W. Evans and A. J. Hall, "A vision for spaceflight reliability: NASA's 
objectives based strategy," in 2015 Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium 
(RAMS), Palm Harbor, FL, 2015, pp.1-6.  
[6]  International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), "System Engineering Vision 
2020," INCOSE-TP-2004-004-02, Sept. 2007. 
[7]  J. L. Barth, C. S. Dyer and E. G. Stassinopoulos, "Space, atmospheric, and terrestrial 
radiation environments," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 466-
482, June 2003.  
[8]  J. R. Schwank et al., "Radiation Effects in MOS Oxides," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear 
Science, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 1833-1853, Aug. 2008.  
[9]  A. H. Johnston, "The influence of VLSI technology evolution on radiation-induced latchup 
in space systems," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 505-521, Apr 
1996.  
[10]  P. V. Nekrasov, A. B. Karakozov, D. V. Bobrovskyi and V. A. Marfin, "Investigation of 
Single Event Functional Interrupts in Microcontoller with PIC17 Architecture," in 2015 
15th European Conference on Radiation and Its Effects on Components and Systems 
(RADECS), Moscow, 2015, pp. 1-4.  
[11]  P. E. Dodd and L. W. Massengill, "Basic mechanisms and modeling of single-event upset 
in digital microelectronics," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 583-
602, June 2003.  
[12]  K. A. LaBel, A. H. Johnston, J. L. Barth, R. A. Reed and C. E. Barnes, "Emerging radiation 
hardness assurance (RHA) issues: a NASA approach for space flight programs," IEEE 
Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 2727-2736, Dec 1998.  
 40 
[13]  K. A. LaBel and M. M. Gates, "Single-event-effect mitigation from a system perspective," 
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 654-660, Apr 1996.  
[14]  J. Puig-Suari, C. Turner and W. Ahlgren, "Development of the standard CubeSat deployer 
and a CubeSat class PicoSatellite," Aerospace Conference, 2001, IEEE Proceedings, vol. 1, 
no. 1, pp. 1/347-1/353, 2001.  
[15]  M. Swartwout, "CubeSat Database," Saint Louis University, [Online]. Available: 
https://sites.google.com/a/slu.edu/swartwout/home/cubesat-database. [Accessed 20 June 
2016]. 
[16]  H. Bahcivan, J. W. Cutler, M. Bennett, B. Kempke, J. C. Springmann, J. Buonocore, M. 
Nicolls and R. Doe, "First measurements of radar coherent scatter by the Radio Aurora 
Explorer CubeSat," Geophys. Res. Lett., vol. 39, no. 14, p. L14101, 2012.  
[17]  L. W. Blum, Q. Schiller, X. Li, R. Millan, A. Halford and L. Woodger, "New conjunctive 
CubeSat and balloon measurements to quantify rapid energetic electron precipitation," 
Geophys. Res. Lett., vol. 40, pp. 5833-5837, 2013.  
[18]  C. S. Fish, C. M. Swenson, G. Crowley, A. Barjatya, T. Neilsen, J. Gunther, I. Azeem, M. 
Pilinski, R. Wilder, D. Allen, M. Anderson, B. Bingham, K. Bradford, S. Burr, R. Burt, B. 
Byers, J. Cook, K. Davis, C. Frazier, S. Grover, G. Hansen, S. Jensen, R. LeBaron, J. 
Martineau, J. Miller, J. Nelsen, W. Nelson, P. Patterson, E. Stromberg, J. Tran, S. Wassom, 
C. Weston, M. Whiteley, Q. Young, J. Petersen, S. Schaire, C. R. Davis, M. Bokaie, R. 
Fullmer, R. Baktur, J. Sojka and M. Cousins, "Design, Development, Implementation, and 
On-orbit Perfromance of the Dynamic Ionosphere CubeSat Experiment Mission," Space 
Sci. Rev., vol. 181, pp. 61-120, 2014.  
[19]  X. Li et al., "First results from CSSWE CubeSat: Characteristics of relativistic electrons in 
the near-Earth environment during the October 2012 magnetic storms," J. Geophys. Res. 
Space Physics, vol. 118, pp. 6489-6499, 2013.  
[20]  S. C. Spangelo et al., "Applying Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) to a standard 
CubeSat," in Aerospace Conference, 2012 IEEE, Big Sky, MT, 2012, pp. 1-20.  
[21]  S. C. Spangelo et al., "Model based systems engineering (MBSE) applied to Radio Aurora 
Explorer (RAX) CubeSat mission operational scenarios," in Aerospace Conference, 2013 
IEEE, Big Sky, MT, 2013, pp. 1-18.  
[22]  L. Anderson et al., "Enterprise modeling for CubeSats," in 2014 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference, Big Sky, MT, 2014, pp. 1-16.  
[23]  D. Kaslow, G. Soremekun, H. Kim and S. Spangelo, "Integrated model-based systems 
engineering (MBSE) applied to the Simulation of a CubeSat mission," in 2014 IEEE 
Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, 2014, pp. 1-14.  
 41 
[24]  D. Kaslow et al., "Developing a CubeSat Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) 
Reference Model - interim status," in 2015 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, 
2015, pp. 1-16.  
[25]  D. Kaslow et al., "Developing a CubeSat Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) 
Reference Model - Interim Status #2," in 2016 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, MT, 
2016, pp. 1-16.  
[26]  D. Nichols and C. Lin, Integrated Model-Centric Engineering: The Application of MBSE at 
JPL Through the Life Cycle, INCOSE International MBSE Workshop, 2014.  
[27]  M. Swartwout, S. Jayaram, R. Reed and R. Weller, "Argus: A flight campaign for 
modeling the effects of space radiation on modern electronics," in Aerospace Conference, 
2012 IEEE, Big Sky, MT, 2012, pp. 1-11.  
[28]  N. A. Dodds et al., "The Contribution of Low-Energy Protons to the Total On-Orbit SEU 
Rate," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 2240-2451, Dec. 2015.  
[29]  M. P. King et al., "Electron-Induced Single-Event Upsets in Static Random Access 
Memory," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 60, no. 6, pp. 4122-4129, Dec. 
2013.  
[30]  J. M. Trippe et al., "Electron-Induced Single Event Upsets in 28 nm and 45 nm Bulk 
SRAMs," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 2709-2716, Dec. 
2015.  
[31]  GSN Community Standard Version 1, Origin Consulting (York) Limited, 2011.  
[32]  R. A. Weaver and T. P. Kelly, "The Goal Structuring Notation - A Safety Argument 
Notation," Proceedings of the Dependable Systems and Networks 2004 Workshop on 
Assurance Cases, July 2004.  
[33]  Y. Chen, M. Lawford, H. Wang and A. Wassyng, "Insulin Pump Software Certification," 
in Foundations of Health Information Engineering and Systems, Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2014, pp. 87-106. 
[34]  M. Maroti, T. Kecskes, R. Kereskenyi, B. Broll, P. Volgyesi, L. Juracz, T. Levendoszky 
and A. Ledeczi, "Next Generation (Meta)Modeling: Web- and Cloud-based Collaborative 
Tool Infrastructure," 2014. 
 
 
